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From the Editor

As we prepare this issue for print production, the search for our next journal editor is in progress. Yes, my five-year term as editor is up and I have decided not to seek reappointment. So as I write -30-on my editorial role, I’d like to thank our division and its leaders as well as AEJMC for trusting me with the editorship of our journal. I couldn’t have done my job without the reliable and expert support of our editorial board as well as the numerous ad hoc reviewers that were recruited from our division or from other AEJMC divisions. It truly was a pleasure working with you. I wish the new editor every success.

In this edition, the observed pattern of publishing media framing research continues. Our lead article is an insightful examination of how the media in Nigeria framed the reporting of the Jos Crisis. Li Zeng, Ngozi Agwaziam and Zhiwen Xiao, in a comparative analysis of the coverage of the *Punch*, *Guardian* and *Thisday*, found that the intertwining of media and politics has manifested in the practice of “advocacy journalism” by the three newspapers in favor of the Nigerian government.

Shifting to television, Jaesik Ha and Shin Haeng Lee show, in their study of U.S. television coverage of Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi during the 2009 UN Assembly Sessions, that U.S. leaders focused on policy issues while American journalists directed more attention to human-rights abuses by Iran and Libya. As expected, the U.S. government and journalists accused Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi for propagating terrorism and leaders of “rogue states” attributed responsibility for the conflicts to the West, particularly the U.S.

The third article by Yu-li Chang and Dale Zacher reports that the world’s press framed the Egyptian uprising as caused mainly by domestic political and economic problems during Mubarak’s 30-year rule. The content analysis of 190 English-language newspaper editorials also noted that the wave of discontent might spread to other dictatorial regimes.

Our book review on Michael Kamber’s *Photojournalists on War: The Untold Stories from Iraq* ties in quite well with this edition’s theme on war and conflict reporting by the world’s media. Kirk Stone wrote in his review that while Kamber’s work is not a scholarly book it reminds “professors and their students that many exceptionally devoted journalists still risk their lives to give the public the news a democracy requires.”
Framing the Jos Crisis in Nigeria:  
A Comparative Analysis of the Punch, the Guardian and Thisday  

By Li Zeng, Ngozi Agwaziam & Zhiwen Xiao

Nigeria is a nation known for recursive socio-political crises. Since 2001, a series of violent clashes between groups of residents in Jos city claimed more than 4,000 lives and are widely referred to as the most severe crisis since the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s. Not surprisingly, the crisis has received intensive media attention. This study seeks to provide some insights on the Nigerian media landscape by comparing how the online version of three influential Nigerian daily newspapers, the Punch, the Guardian and Thisday, covered the 2010-2011 Jos crisis. A total of 300 stories were systematically and randomly selected during the lifespan of the crisis over a four-month period from December 2010 to March 2011. The findings suggest that a strong interplay remained between the Nigerian government and the media. The three newspapers continued to practice “advocacy journalism” by focusing on the government. However, the Punch and Thisday were not as strong advocates as the Guardian. Specifically, the Punch tended to rely more heavily on wire services. Thisday was more information driven, by focusing dominantly on the actions of the crisis, and presenting relatively neutral information on the actions rather than the analysis of reactions.

Introduction

When a crisis occurs, the public is in great need of information in order to reduce uncertainty. Media frames of crises, therefore, are powerful mechanisms that may influence the public’s thoughts and perceptions (Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001; Tedesco,

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2001), as they evaluate the cause, attribute responsibilities and understand consequences. Past research has examined media framing of crises of different nature, ranging from natural disasters (e.g., Lin, 2012; Littlefield & Quenette, 2007) to social and political crises (e.g., Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). However, very little research has focused on crisis coverage in Nigeria, a nation known for recursive socio-political crises (Chilunwa, 2011). Bello, Adejola and Jamiu (2012) called for research on news reporting by traditional and mainstream media in Nigeria.

This study seeks to fill the research gap by examining how the Nigerian press covered a major violent conflict, the Jos crisis, which first broke out in 2001 between Muslim and Christian residents in the tin-mining city of Jos. The crisis has resulted in a series of violent clashes between the two major religious groups, claiming more than 4,000 lives. The crisis also has attracted intensive media attention for more than a decade and is widely referred to as the most severe domestic crisis since the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s. Widely known as the 2010-2011 Jos crisis, the deadliest clash in Jos happened between December 2010 and March 2011 with a record number of over 1,200 people killed within four months. Using media framing as the theoretical framework, this study focuses on the coverage of the 2010-2011 Jos crisis in three leading Nigerian newspapers, the Punch, Guardian and Thisday.

Theoretical Framework: Media Framing of Crises

Media framing refers to the process during which news topics are selected and packaged (Iyengar, 1991). It essentially involves applying salience through: 1) selection of some topics while leaving others out, and 2) portrayal of some elements of reality while undermining others (Entman, 1993). As a “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974), a media frame allows the media to simplify, prioritize and structure the narration of events, thus allowing individuals to quickly sort out, interpret and evaluate the events (Norris, et al., 2003).

Various scholars have examined how the media frame crises (e.g., Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012; Littlefield & Quenette, 2007; Muschert, 2009). The most important aspects of media framing
include themes, source attribution, tones and bylines of news coverage.

**Themes**

As the subject matter of a news story, a news theme helps define a news event, which in consequence allows individuals to interpret and evaluate the event. Researchers have identified different themes in media framing, such as actors in an event, actions, reactions and consequences. For example, Muschert (2009) found that reactions were the most prominent theme in U.S. newspaper coverage of the Columbine school shooting. Zeng and Tahat (2012) identified various themes in terrorism coverage by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, including conflict, international cooperation and terrorism effects on the community, among others.

**Source attribution**

Sources are essential components of a news story. Journalists often depend on credible sources for information they do not know personally. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) noted the tremendous effect that sources may have on a news story, by providing the context within which other information may be evaluated. They also pointed out that sources could monopolize the journalist’s time so as not to allow him/her to seek alternative views.

Journalists tend to rely on certain types of sources, such as government officials, individuals with expertise, witnesses, etc. According to Zoch and Turk (1998), government representatives are quoted because they add credence and authenticity to the story. In addition, government sources are preferred by journalists due to government officials’ availability for interviews and at press conferences. In a study of television news coverage of the Persian Gulf War, Steele (1995) found expert sources were used because of their wealth of knowledge of the subject matter.

**Tone**

As an important aspect of news framing, tones used in news reporting vary and carry different connotations, thus implying
negativity or positivity and affecting how the information is perceived. Teng’O (2008) pointed out that Western media tend to use the neutral tone in news reporting, which is in line with the objectivity standard for good journalism. On the other hand, Brunken (2006) noted that news media use certain descriptive words to establish an accurate and detailed perspective of print media’s influence.

Instead of focusing on the positive versus negative dichotomy of tones, Picard and Adams (1991) argued that what matters most is whether the tone is subjective or objective. Therefore, they created two categories, nominal versus descriptive, in their analysis of terrorism coverage. According to their definition, nominal labels are neutral and portray little subjective evaluations, while descriptive labels are more detailed, weighty and carry more connotative meanings that are either negative or positive. In addition, while most researchers tend to treat sources and labels as two separate variables, Picard and Adams (1991) found that government officials tend to use more descriptive terms that are inflammatory or contain strong connotations.

**Bylines**

The byline of a news story refers to who writes it. Traditionally, most newspapers are known to depend on their own staff in news reporting (Reich, 2010). As a consequence of commercialization of the news industry, however, news agencies nowadays play an important role in providing news materials, particularly when a news organization cannot afford to hire correspondents in the locale of a remote news event. The U.S media, for example, have been known as heavy users of wire services due to cost efficiency and objectivity concerns (Rampal, 2007). However, in an analysis of African news on the websites of five Western news organizations and an African news aggregator, Teng’O (2008) found that the six organizations mostly relied on their own staff writers. Similarly, Ekeanyanwu (2007) reported that four Nigerian newspapers’ in-house staff wrote nearly two-thirds of the news stories about political crises and conflicts during 2003-2007, while only 5.1% of the stories came from news agencies.
Mass Media in Nigeria

It is difficult to understand the mass media in Nigeria without taking into consideration the strong interplay of media and politics. Nigerian politicians have long recognized the power of the press as a tool for propaganda (Uka, 1989), which explains why some prominent politicians strive for control of the media. For example, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first president of Nigeria, controlled 10 newspapers and Obafemi Awolowo, his rival, had 14 (Ekeanyanwu, 2007).

In the 1990s, media ownership in Nigeria underwent tremendous changes. While the government still owned and controlled some media corporations (such as Daily Times and Nigeria Tribune) to advance government ideals, the ones that were privately owned promoted the ideals and political views of their owners (e.g., Concord Group of Newspapers, which supported the winning candidate in the 1993 presidential election). The annulment of the 1993 presidential election marked the true beginning of private media ownership and media resistance in Nigeria. However, this was accompanied by increased media ownership by politicians and ex-military personnel (Nwachuku, n.d.).

In addition to directly owning or controlling the media, the government exerts strong influence on the media through a number of means, including law enforcement, coopting and appellations. The government is quick to enact laws to restrain and control the media. Certain loopholes or ambiguous portions of government decrees are often used against the media (Nwachuku, n.d.). Influential journalists are swayed toward the governments’ leanings through bribes or preferential treatment (Abonyi, 2010; Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001). Executives of media organizations, public or privately owned, are appointed in top government offices. As a consequence, these media owners and managers are indirectly indebted to the government and choose to implement self-censorship. In addition, appellations are used to create hierarchy among media stations (Udeajah, 2006). Access denial to certain places is another method the government uses to restrict press freedom (Omu, 1978). In the worst scenario, media houses are shut down for opposing the government.
Research Questions

This study focuses on the coverage of the 2010-2011 Jos Crisis in three leading Nigerian daily newspapers: the *Punch*, *Guardian* and *Thisday*. The *Punch* is one of the most widely-read newspapers in Nigeria. Historically known for appealing to the working class, it is popular among people with basic literacy. Since 2000, the paper has been repositioning itself to “appeal for a more up-market audience,” which helps boost its advertising revenue (Rap21, 2004). It is now a popular national daily, particularly among politicians and businessmen.

Popular among young readers such as college students, the *Guardian* boasts itself as an objective newspaper independent of any political party, ethnic community or interest/religious group. It focuses on business content and appeals to the most educated section of the elite while maintaining independent and sober views (Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001).

A relatively young newspaper, *Thisday* grew within a short period of time to establish its name among the leading newspapers in Nigeria. Known for its business and political reporting and for breaking big news stories, it has won several awards, including Newspaper of the Year for three consecutive years (About us, 2013). As a high-profile newspaper, it is preferred among business, political and diplomatic elites, particularly the younger generations.

This study asks the following research questions:

**RQ 1:** Did the *Punch*, *Guardian* and *Thisday* differ in themes when covering the 2010-2011 Jos crisis?

**RQ 2:** Did the three newspapers differ in sources when covering the Jos crisis?

**RQ 3:** Did the three newspapers differ in tone when covering the Jos crisis?

**RQ 4:** Was the type of dominant sources associated with the tone used in the coverage?
RQ 5: Did the three newspapers differ in their reliance on their own staff writers and news agencies?

Method

Data Selection

The researchers used the keyword “Jos” to search the online archives on the websites of the Punch, Guardian and Thisday from December 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011. A total of 5,451 articles were retrieved, with 3,700 from the Punch, 1,251 from the Guardian and 500 from Thisday. Using a systematic random sampling procedure, the researchers selected every 37th article from the Punch, every 13th article from the Guardian and every 5th article for Thisday. Four additional articles were systematically and randomly selected from the rest of the Guardian articles. This sampling procedure yielded a total of 300 articles for this study, with 100 from each of the three newspapers.

Measures

Themes. Four major themes were coded: 1) actions, if a story focused on the actual clash such as damaging houses, hurting people, etc.; 2) reactions, for example, reactions from the government, community or individuals; 3) actors, for example, perpetrators of the crisis; 4) consequences of the crisis, such as the destructive effects of the crisis on Jos or preventive measures to forestall a reoccurrence, etc.

Source attribution. Four types of news sources were coded: 1) government representatives; 2) involved individuals, such as witnesses, victims, suspects and their families; 3) affiliated individuals, such as representatives of non-governmental organizations, traditional and religious leaders and politicians who were not government representatives but affiliated with particular organizations; 4) other individuals. The frequency of each source type was first recorded for each story. The source type with the highest frequency was coded as the dominant source for the story. In case two source types ended up with equal frequency,
the type that appeared first in the story was coded as the dominant one.

**Tone.** Tone was coded as either nominal or descriptive. Nominal tone included articles that were neutral, void of judgment, and those that only presented the fact. For example, an article was coded as using a nominal tone if it reported the incident without stressing any particular angle or attempting to add analysis to it. Descriptive tone featured labels that were positive or negative, optimistic, logical, hostile, conflicting, or with aggressive language. They contained deeper meanings and leaned toward particular angles or perspectives.

**Bylines.** Bylines were coded into three categories: 1) staff: in-house staff such as reporters, correspondents, editors and other news workers hired by the newspaper; 2) wire service: News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), Reuters, Associated Press and other news agencies; 3) other.

In addition, the publication date and the length (measured as the number of words) of each story were recorded.

**Inter-coder Reliability**

Inter-coder reliability was measured between one of the researchers and a graduate student who was trained to code. Thirty stories were randomly selected from the stories not included in the sample of 300 stories. Based on the coding instructions provided by the researchers, the two coders coded independently. A Holsti’s (1969) inter-coder reliability of 1.00 was reached for date and length, 0.97 for bylines, 0.93 for dominant sources and 0.87 for themes and tones.

**Findings and Discussion**

The average length of all 300 stories in the sample was 731 words. With a total number of 5,451 stories on the topic, this reflected the intensive media attention the 2010-2011 Jos crisis attracted during the four months, thus indicating the importance and salience of the crisis on the Nigerian media agenda.
Themes

RQ1 asked whether the three papers differed in themes. Analysis of the themes revealed significant differences among the three newspapers ($\chi^2 = 45.71$, df = 6, p < .05) (see Table 1). The Guardian reported reactions much more frequently than the other two papers, with more than two-thirds (68%) of its articles focusing on reactions. The reaction theme also dominated in the Punch, accounting for nearly half (48%) of the 100 stories in the sample. For example, a Punch story focused on the reactions of an Islamic group to the December 24th bombing in the Jos Plateau, for which the group claimed responsibility (Adepegba & Soriwei, 2010).

In contrast, only a third (33%) of the stories in Thisday were about reactions, while slightly more (37% of the total) stories focused on actions, making actions the dominant theme in Thisday. For instance, a story (Adinoyi, 2010) described the killing in Nwachukwu village in Kwal, Miango, Bassa Local Government Area of Plateau State as “a fresh attack,” in which seven people were killed and four injured. The article further reported that “the attack was suspected to be a reprisal of the alleged killing of a Fulani herdsman in Gero village of Jos South LGA of the state, marking the fifth of such attacks in two months” (Adinoyi, 2010).

The Punch and Guardian each reported actions in only about 12% of their articles. In fact, actions were not the second dominant theme in the Punch and Guardian. Rather, the second dominant theme in the Punch was consequences, appearing in 24% of the stories. Although the second dominant theme in the Guardian was actors, it appeared less frequently in the Guardian than in the Punch (15%) or Thisday (15%). Very few of the stories (5%) in the Guardian focused on consequences.

Consistent with Muschert’s (2009) finding that reactions were the prevalent theme in the coverage of the Columbine school shooting in the U.S. press, the dominance of the reactions theme in both the Punch and Guardian highlighted a massive acknowledgement of the Jos crisis among the public, thus emphasizing the event’s salience. Though the crisis was one with recurring actions over time, actions did not wind up as the dominant theme in the Punch and Guardian, nor did the theme of actors.
The finding about lack of attention to actors in the conflict raises the question why. No story in the sample focused on security officers making arrests. As noted in the *Punch* (Eze, 2010), “violence always persists in the country because perpetrators always go unpunished.” In fact, the government did not attempt to punish those behind the atrocities even when certain groups claimed responsibility for violent activities. For example, a Muslim group claimed responsibility on a website for the attack on December 25, 2010 (Adinoyi & Ogunmade, 2010). However, no follow-up report was available about tracing the perpetrators by any means. Instead, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police brushed off comments on the site, calling the acknowledgement a decoy to distract the police force (Adepegba & Soriwei, 2010).

Compared to the *Punch* and *Guardian*, *Thisday* focused on the actions more often than on reactions. This was a deviation from the norm in the literature, which might be explained by *Thisday’s* style and policy. With the youth as the majority of its target readers, *Thisday* might have adopted this deviation as a way of distin-

Table 1: Themes by Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Paper (n = 296)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>Thisday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions</td>
<td>48 (48%)</td>
<td>68 (68%)</td>
<td>33 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>12 (12%)</td>
<td>12 (12%)</td>
<td>37 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>15 (15%)</td>
<td>13 (13%)</td>
<td>15 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>24 (24%)</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>14 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99 (99%)</td>
<td>98 (98%)</td>
<td>99 (99%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 45.71, df = 6, p = .001$

Note: The total does not add to 100% because “other” themes were excluded in the analysis. These “other” themes were related to other activities in Jos such as the presidential election campaigns.
guishing itself through communicating current situations of the crisis to its audience. From this perspective, *Thisday* seemed to be more information-driven than analysis-driven.

**Dominant Sources**

RQ2 asked about possible differences in the dominant sources used by the three newspapers. Analysis of the dominant sources by individual papers showed significant differences ($\chi^2 = 23.03$, df = 4, $p < .05$) (see Table 2). While government representatives were most frequently cited as dominant sources in all three dailies, *Thisday* was more likely to cite government sources (60%) than the *Guardian* (48%) and the *Punch* (39%). For all three papers, the next dominant category was affiliated individuals, but with varying frequencies. While the *Guardian* quoted affiliated individuals in nearly two-fifths (39%) of its articles, *Thisday* (30%) and the *Punch* (26%) quoted affiliated individuals less frequently. Most importantly, the *Punch* cited involved individuals as the dominant source in one out of five (20%) of its articles, far more frequently than the *Guardian* (3%) and *Thisday* (7%).

Table 2: Sources by Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Papers (n = 272)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>39 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated individuals</td>
<td>26 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved individuals</td>
<td>20 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85 (85%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 23.03$, df = 4, $p = .001$

Note: The total does not add to 100% because “other” sources were excluded in the analysis.
Not surprisingly, government officials were the main sources in the coverage of the Jos crisis, a finding in line with past research (e.g. Bennett, 1990; Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005). As Shoemaker and Reese (1991) noted, heavy reliance on government officials may be viewed as political propaganda and highlights the power of politicians and politics. The government depends on the media to create in the minds of its citizens a perception of its devotion and commitment to duty. On the other hand, the media are open to government sourcing. As a consequence, the media serve as a tool to promote government positions and sentiments. Ekeanyanwu (2007) pointed out that the Nigerian media usually practice “advocacy journalism” when reporting political conflicts and crises. This might be due in part to ready funds from the government, licensing, recognition and ease of scheduling press conferences. This might also be explained by Zoch and Turk’s (1998) suggestion that the media depend on government sourcing for believability and credence.

It is worth noting that the Punch distinguished itself from its competition by using involved individuals as the dominant sources in 20% of its stories. This might be explained by its long tradition of serving the working class. Despite its shift in focus during recent years to a more “up-market” readership (Rap21, 2004), it is possible that the Punch still remains a media outlet that addresses the concerns of the average people, which may explain why it continues to lead in circulation among all Nigerian newspapers.

**Tone**

RQ3 asked whether the three papers differed in the tone of their Jos crisis coverage. Significant differences were found among the individual papers in the type of tones ($\chi^2 = 8.67$, df=2, p < .05) (Table 3). In the Punch and Guardian, majority of the articles (59% each) used descriptive tones, while Thisday used nominal tones in most of its stories (59%). A possible explanation is that the Punch and Guardian focused more on reactions, which tended to involve expressions with more connotations, while Thisday focused more on actions, which would more likely be reported using a neutral tone.
Table 3: Tone by Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Papers (n = 300)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>Thisday</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>41 (41%)</td>
<td>41 (41%)</td>
<td>59 (59%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>59 (59%)</td>
<td>59 (59%)</td>
<td>41 (41%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total(N)</td>
<td>100 (100%)</td>
<td>100 (100%)</td>
<td>100 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 8.67, df = 2, p = .013

RQ4 asked about the association between the type of dominant sources and tone. A cross tabulation of tones and types of dominant sources showed statistical differences (χ² = 39.09, df = 2, p < .05) (see Table 4). Nominal tones were used in about two-thirds (67%) of the articles in which government representatives were the dominant sources. For example, when reporting a clash that killed seven people, an article cited the state Police Command, who tried to calm down the situation by first confirming the killings and then reassuring the people that “investigations are in top gear to track down the perpetrators” (Adinoyi, 2010).

In contrast, descriptive tones were used in nearly three quarters (74%) of the articles where affiliated individuals were cited, and stories citing involved individuals as the dominant sources were also more likely to employ a descriptive tone (53%) than a nominal one (47%). In a Thisday article about the December 25th bomb blasts, for example, witness Munir Nasidi, a businessman who was in a hotel opposite the church when the blast occurred, described that “people were running around. Everyone was crying. They were bringing out casualties. Nobody was getting near the building as there was a fire” (Nwosu, et al., 2011). The article continued to report that “eye witnesses said windows of nearby houses had been shattered by the explosion.”

A possible explanation is that government sources might use the nominal tone to avoid further uprising and deteriorating reactions from the public. Government sources, who are
often cited when giving prepared speeches, are usually highly selective of their words. On the other hand, the other types of sources, especially affiliated and involved individuals, might be antagonistic of how the government handled the crisis, thus they tended to use the descriptive tone frequently.

Table 4: Tone by Dominant Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Dominant Sources (n = 272)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>99 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>48 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>147 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 39.09, \ df = 2, \ p = .001 \)

Bylines

RQ5 asked how the three newspapers differed in their bylines. Consistent with what Teng’O (2008) found about African news on foreign media websites, analysis of bylines showed that in-house staff wrote the majority of the stories in all three newspapers. This might be explained by a sense of patriotism (not relying on foreign news agencies) and a lack of confidence in the only domestic news agency, News Agency of Nigeria, which is affiliated with the Nigerian government.

However, significant differences were found among the three dailies in their bylines (\( \chi^2 = 95.83, \ df = 4, \ p < .05 \)) (see Table 5). Both the Guardian and Thisday depended almost exclusively on their own staff, with the vast majority of the stories written by their in-house staff (86% in the Guardian and 91% in Thisday), and the others by freelancers and general readers. None of the articles in the Guardian or Thisday came from a wire service. In
contrast, the *Punch* displayed a relatively balanced reliance on their in-house staff and wire services, with the former contributing 48% of all stories and the latter 40%. As Reich (2010) noted, a combination of staff and wire authorship may help reduce personality factors and individual choices during news reporting. Moreover, it conveys a sense of objectivity. In this sense, the *Punch* distinguished itself by using both its own staff and wire services for relatively more objective reporting.

Table 5: Bylines by Newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bylines</th>
<th>Papers (n = 300)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Punch</em></td>
<td><em>Guardian</em></td>
<td><em>Thisday</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>48 (48%)</td>
<td>86 (86%)</td>
<td>91 (91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire Service</td>
<td>40 (40%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12 (12%)</td>
<td>14 (14%)</td>
<td>9 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (100%)</td>
<td>100(100%)</td>
<td>100(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*χ² = 95.83, df = 4, p = .001*

Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This study is an exploratory effort to understand how the Nigerian press portrays socio-political crises. Using media framing, this study provides valuable insights on the current media landscape in Nigeria, particularly in situations where local recursive violent conflicts are involved. At least two conclusions can be drawn from the findings.

First, the strong interplay remains between the government and the media. Nigerian media, at least the three newspapers selected in this study, continue to practice “advocacy journalism” by focusing on the government. The media are more tilted toward portraying the government and its reactions than those involved in a crisis, such as victims. The three newspapers in this study cited more government sources than involved individuals and the actors. The media’s support for the government may re-
reflect their efforts to receive possible economic, social or political benefits that the government offers, or simply to gain recognition for growth. Furthermore, the media’s choice of government sources may be related to feelings of inferiority versus superiority. That is, some gatekeepers in the news-making process may view government representatives as superior and legitimate sources that should be included in news stories, while victims are considered inferior and thus not worthwhile sources.

On the other hand, although most media organizations are now privately owned and operated, the government still has substantial control over the media. The Nigerian government uses the media as a propaganda tool to convince the public of its efforts to salvage the crisis situation. Using nominal tones frequently, government officials left the public with the impression that the government held an unbiased position, and was at the same time concerned about its citizens’ welfare when little was done to improve the situation. With the help of the media, the government deliberately diverted attention from the perpetrators of the crisis. As Ekeanyanwu (2007) put it, the newspapers “operated more as active players in political crises and conflicts than as an impartial judge” (p. 64). Therefore, a lot needs to be done before the press can serve as a voice for the Nigerian public.

Secondly, among the three newspapers, the Punch and Thisday performed slightly better in providing information for their readers. Thisday was more information driven. Aside from focusing dominantly on the actions of the crisis, Thisday presented relatively neutral information on the actions rather than an analysis of reactions. This reflects the newspaper’s attempt for objectivity, leaving the audience to reason for themselves. The Punch’s objectivity is reflected in its news authorship that combined staff and wire services. By following the media practice in more developed countries, the Punch distinguished itself as a leading newspaper in Nigeria.

Caution should be drawn when interpreting the findings from this study. A major limitation of this study is the purposive sample. Influential as they are in the nation, all three newspapers are based in the southwestern part of Nigeria (Lagos), where the headquarters of most of the largest Nigerian media organiza-
tions are located. Due to their distance from the location of the Jos crisis, the three dailies can by no means represent the overall Nigerian press. In addition, this distance might have influenced how the three papers framed the crisis. Therefore, analysis of other newspapers that are nearer to Jos may help reveal press coverage in the locale of the crisis.

Future research should also study media coverage of other crises in Nigeria, including crises of other nature, such as the Niger Delta crisis from the 1990s or the 1993 presidential election crisis, both of which still have long-term impact on Nigeria.

References


Grilling the Leaders of Rogue States:
U.S. TV Coverage of Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi
During the 2009 UN Assembly Sessions

By Jaesik Ha & Shin Haeng Lee

This study examines sound bites on U.S. television which contained statements by U.S. government officials, U.S. broadcast journalists and the leaders of rogue states (Iran’s Ahmedinejad and Libya’s Gaddafi) during the 64th session of the United Nations Assembly in 2009. The study shows that the Obama administration focused on policy-related issues such as Iran’s nuclear armament program, the Afghan war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while American journalists were more interested in the repression of human rights by rogue states, such as the Iran government’s crackdown on dissidents, Libya’s role in the Lockerbie bombing and Ahmedinejad’s denial of the Holocaust. There is also a big difference in the responsibility frames employed. While U.S. government officials and journalists accused the leaders of rogue states of perpetuating terrorism and war, the rogue state leaders blamed the U.S., its allies and the news media for the origins of conflicts and terrorism.

Communication scholars have claimed that American mainstream media tend to consistently follow their government’s policies in foreign affairs issues such as terrorism and war (Bennett, 2009; Paletz & Entman, 1981). One of the reasons for this is that journalists consider official sources to be newsworthy and authoritative (Henderson, 2004). Cohen (1963) pointed out that public officials are considered “prime sources of news merely by virtue of their positions in government” (p. 28). In their coverage of anti-terrorism efforts since September 11, 2001, the U.S.

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media have relied heavily on their own government officials as their news sources (Bennett, 2009). This has led to the criticism that the U.S. media do not play their proper role as government watchdogs when covering American foreign policies, such as the Iraq War (Bennett, 2009; Bennett, et al., 2006; Entman, 2003, 2004). In this regard, the media’s reliance on government officials as their authoritative sources has not changed, even since the end of the Cold War (Bennett, 2009).

In particular, since September 11, 2001, the anti-terrorism frame has functioned as a powerful ideological tool in much the same way as the Cold War frame was prevalent and authoritative beginning in the 1950s (Bennett, 2009; Barnett & Reynolds, 2009). It has been one of the most prominent frames that the U.S. news media use when its government officials try to portray anti-terrorism as an urgent issue on their agendas (Nacos, 2007). Barnett and Reynolds (2009) claim that “Terrorism became a part of the daily news cycle in the United States after September 11, and it entered into some of the routine questions journalists asked at disaster and other crime scenes” (p. 47).

Since the 1980s, five countries — Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea — have been consistently called “rogue” by American government officials (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2007). Thus, these countries have been considered to be serious threats to the peace and stability of international society. For instance, in January 2002, in his State of the Union address, President George Bush selected Iraq, Iran and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil,” claiming that these three nations “constitute an axis of evil, aiming to threaten the peace of the world” (Kessler & Baker, 2006). President Bush’s characterization of these three countries as an “axis of evil” has not only been reflected in his administration’s foreign policies, but has also functioned as a symbolic term frequently used to disparage those countries during his presidency (Ha, 2010). President Barack Obama (2009) also said in his inaugural address that “Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred…. With old friends and former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat.”

This study investigates what kinds of issues and frames were put forward by three groups of political elites during the annual
meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2009: (1) U.S. President Obama and other high-ranking U.S. officials; (2) U.S. broadcast journalists who interviewed Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and Libya’s leader Gaddafi; (3) Gaddafi and Ahmadinejad themselves. Specifically, it compares the difference in the framing employed by these elites by examining not only whom they attempted to blame for international conflicts, but also what kinds of angles they highlighted in presenting an issue. In order to do this, this study analyzed sound bites from U.S. TV news programs which contained statements by U.S. officials, TV journalists and the leaders of the so-called “rogue states.”

In the area of foreign affairs, the annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly is a worldwide event where confrontations among the leaders of countries are often dramatically staged. The 64th session of the UN Assembly began in New York on September 15, 2009 and the final debate was held on September 28-29, 2009. During this event, one of the most contentious issues discussed was whether or not Iran had clandestinely developed a nuclear weapon. In a meeting with France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown, President Obama (2009) criticized Iran’s secret efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons, saying that “The existence of this facility underscores Iran’s continuing unwillingness to meet its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA requirements.”

In the UN General Assembly, Iran’s Ahmadinejad and Libya’s Gaddafi received more attention than any other leaders. President Ahmadinejad was a controversial figure because of concern about the Iranian nuclear weapons program and his suppression of dissidents and Iranian citizens after the disputed presidential election of June 2009. Hundreds of protesters expressed their anger at President Ahmadinejad outside the UN building, saying that Ahmadinejad had stolen Iran’s election (Landler & Fathi, 2009). In his address, President Ahmadinejad defended the election as “glorious and fully democratic” (Landler & Fathi, 2009). Libya’s Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s first appearance in the UN after 40 years in power culminated when he tore up and threw away the UN charter during his speech, which took 90 minutes
instead of the allotted 15. In this address, he advocated “the right of the Taliban to establish an Islamic emirate” (MacFarquhar, 2009).

**Literature Review**

The independence of the U.S. press from its government during the Cold War has often been questioned (Herman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Rachlin, 1988). Foreign events during this period were often framed within the government’s interpretations and resonated with larger cultural themes (Entman, 1991; Kim, 2000; Rachlin, 1988). Coverage of foreign issues was most often determined by the Cold War confrontation and the ideological rivalry with the communist Soviet Union (Entman, 1991). The U.S. media have been found to rely on government officials in not only their daily coverage of foreign issues, but also in their presentation of issues and frames (Bennett, 2009). Now that the ideological confrontation between East and West has abated somewhat, we might ask whether the coverage of foreign issues by news media changed. Have the U.S. media become more independent from their government? This study takes framing theory as its theoretical base and, more specifically, focuses on the frame-building process.

**Framing Theory**

Framing theory has functioned as a useful context in which to examine media texts. Framing theory focuses on the particular ways in which issues are presented (Weaver, 2007, p. 184). This theory is concerned with “the way interests, communicators, sources and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding the world, which are developed using all of the available verbal and visual symbolic resources” (Reese, 2001, p. 11). Thus, framing works “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient” and can “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). In particular, when journalists and politicians present an issue or event, they necessarily highlight or exclude certain parts of real-
ity (Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Nelson, et al., 1997). As a result, they “make decisions or frame a story such that it propagates a particular version of reality” (Hickerson, et al., 2011, p. 790).

Journalists are dependent on certain frames not only to “organize the world” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7), but also to package and present their news stories (Price, et al., 1997). When journalists also present an issue to their audiences, they tend to present that issue within certain frames (Gamson, 1992). These frames “reflect broader cultural themes and narratives” and “supply citizens with a basic tool kit of ideas they [may] use in thinking about and talking about politics” (Price et al., 1997, p. 482). One of the reasons why framing matters is that it functions as a powerful device for a different portrayal of the same event or issue (Nelson et al., 1997). Divergent representations of same issue are made possible by the words, phrases, images and “angles” which journalists choose to employ (Entman, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997).

**The Frame Building Process**

Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) assert that frame building encompasses “the question of how frames get established in societal discourse and how different frames compete for adoption by societal elites and journalists” (p. 22). They emphasize that frame building takes place in three areas: “journalistic norms, political actors, and cultural contexts” (2009, p. 22, emphasis added). That is, frame building refers to the production and flow of frames that exert a powerful influence on social discourse.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) presented five distinct layers that influence the content of the media: the individual level, media routine level, organizational level, extramedia level and the ideological level. This broad framework includes various kinds of influence from social ideology to the values held by individual journalists. Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) maintain that frame building is shaped by “macroscopic mechanisms that deal with message construction rather than media effects” (p. 12). They add, “The activities of interest groups, policymakers, journalists and other groups interested in shaping media agendas and frames can have an impact on both the volume and character of
news messages about a particular issue” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12).

Framing studies may be classified according to whether the frames were used as independent or dependent variables (Scheufele, 1999). This study sets frames as the dependent variable. Scheufele (1999) points out that “Studies of frames as dependent variables have examined the role of various factors in influencing the creation or modification of frames” (p. 107).

In particular, this study attempts to examine the dynamic relationship between media and government. At the governmental level, frame building is influenced by the elite groups: government officials and other political actors, including congressmen (Bennett, 2009; Edelman, 1977; Rottinghaus, 2008). At the media level, media framing is influenced by social norms, organizational pressure or situations, professional routines, relationships with political groups, including the president (Scheufele, 1999; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978).

Framing and Terrorism

U.S. journalists are frequently criticized in their news coverage of war and terrorism because they tend to support their government’s stance on foreign policy issues (Bennett, 2009; Entman, 1991; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Kim, 2000). Herman (1993) analyzed the Gulf War news coverage and concluded that “U.S. mass media coverage was to an extraordinary degree a servant of official policy” (p. 45). Rachlin (1988) also claimed that U.S. media coverage is influenced by the U.S. government. News articles on international issues “seem shaped more by images and understanding originating in an American society/political/economic ecology than by the events themselves” (Rachlin, 1988, p. 127).

Due to his position as the foremost source of news, the U.S. president plays a powerful role in the building of news agendas and frames (Graber, 2010); and the president’s influence on the news media is more dominant in the area of foreign affairs because the news media tend to be more dependent in that area on government officials, including the president (Bennett, 2009; Entman, 2003, 2004). McCombs, et al. (1982) examined Richard
Nixon’s 1970 State of the Union address and found that the agenda of 15 issues emphasized in the address influenced the American media’s agendas in the following month.

After analyzing the news coverage of the September 11 attack, Williamson (2003) points out that “Journalists quickly abandoned all pretense of objectivity and became the uncritical mouthpiece of the U.S. state” (p. 177). Ravi (2005) examined coverage of the Iraq war in five major newspapers from the United States, United Kingdom, Pakistan and India. He found that the “American war frame, with its emphasis on the overall military strategy, dominated the American and the British newspapers,” while the newspapers in Pakistan and India covered more frequently the Iraqi perspectives and civilian deaths (Ravi, 2005, p. 45).

Bennett’s indexing theory highlights the consistent failures among U.S. journalists to question the U.S. government’s foreign policies due to the news media’s tendency to follow elite perspectives. Bennett (2009) claims that, even since the end of the Cold War, the news media is still limited in its challenging of the government’s framing. He points out that the U.S. media did not properly confront President Bush and his government officials who had promoted the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003. Also, previous studies showed that enemy countries’ rulers are depicted as merciless, dictatorial and inhumane in news coverage by the U.S. media (Ha, 2009; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Obad, 2003; Parenti, 1993). Iyengar and Simon (1993) pointed out that the U.S. media portrayed Saddam Hussein as “a modern Hitler, bent on annexing Kuwait and controlling the world supply of petroleum” (p. 382).

Entman (2003, 2004) proposes the “cascading activation” model as a framework for explaining government-media relations after the end of the Cold War. Entman (2004) claims that, even after the attacks of September 11, “one thing it did not change was the news media’s traditional promotion of patriotic rallies around presidents when America appears [to be] under attack” (p. 2). However, Entman (2004) claims that the news media “are not entirely passive receptacles for government propaganda, at least not always” (p. 428). He contends that the news media can cultivate their own independent and critical
frame, sometimes moving away from the government’s framing of issues. According to Entman (2003, 2004), in the post-Cold War era, there are opportunities for a journalist, expert or citizen at the lower levels to propose their own counterframes and challenge the government’s interpretation of issues or events.

**Hypotheses and Research Question**

In framing studies of media discourse, the examination of issues or themes is a useful way to detect a frame in news texts (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Cogan, 2005; Hanson, 1995; Sandberg, 2008). Prince (1984) defined “theme” as “a macrostructural category or frame allowing for the unification of distinct (and discontinuous) textual elements” (p. 5). In this context, this study examines what kinds of issues are more prominently accentuated in statements by U.S. government officials, U.S. journalists and the leaders of rogue states. Thus, this study asks the following research question:

**RQ 1:** What kinds of issues did U.S. officials, American broadcast journalists and the leaders of rogue states emphasize during the 64th session of the UN General Assembly?

Politicians and journalists tell their audience “which aspects of the problem are most important to think about when making a judgment” (Kim, *et al.*, 2011, p. 294). Their intention is to help their audiences make an attribution of responsibility (Kim, *et al.*, 2010). There are two types of attributions of responsibility: causal and treatment responsibilities (Iyengar, 1989). Causal responsibility concerns the origin of the problem, while treatment responsibility refers to who is accountable for alleviating that problem (Kim *et al.*, 2010, p. 565). Therefore, the framing of an issue entails both who causes a problem and who is responsible for fixing the problem (Entman, 1991, 1993; Lee & Yang, 1996; Tankard, *et al.*, 1991).

Journalists often regard their own country’s national interest to be one of the most important criteria of newsworthiness (Herman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Lee & Yang, 1996;
Rachlin, 1988). This tendency is particularly true in foreign news coverage involving their home country (Entman, 1991; Kim & Lee, 2003; Lee & Yang, 1996; Novais, 2007). In this regard, Lee and Yang (1996) claim that, in the coverage of foreign affairs, national interest "often transcends or subsumes partisan rifts which are characteristic of domestic politics" (p. 2).

Therefore, what causes the problem and who is responsible for solving it could be both important in the public statements made by three groups of political elites: U.S. officials, American TV journalists and the leaders of rogue states. Thus, during the 64th session of the UN General Assembly, American officials and journalists were likely to blame the rogue states and their leaders for various terrorist activities, including the pursuit of nuclear weapons. By contrast, it is likely that the leaders of rogue states will attribute global conflicts to the U.S. and its allies. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

**H1:** U.S. officials and journalists will assign the responsibility for conflicts to rogue states, while the leaders of rogue states will frame the West, including the U.S., as being responsible.

Frames have both individual and media components (Scheufele, 1999). The individual frame refers to the mental index upon which an individual processes information, while media frames are more formalized for the identification and classification of information. Media frames are further subdivided into issue-specific and generic frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Issue-specific frames basically deal with the angle through which an issue is examined. This could be from the human angle, its moral component, conflict, or its policy/issue implications. To justify their stance on foreign affairs and present themselves as sensible policy-makers, politicians may be expected to put more emphasis on issues or policies in their public statements than on other aspects. However, human interest is one of the most important criteria in journalists’ news value judgments (Bennett, 2009; Campbell, et al., 2011). One possible result of U.S. journalism’s tendency to favor human interest-focused reporting is the personalization of events or issues (Bennett, 2009). Therefore,
it is probable that American TV journalists use human interest angles when interpreting the issues as a way to appeal to their audience and to represent themselves as advocates of humanitarian causes. Thus, this study proposes the following hypothesis.

**H 2:** Among the issue-specific frames, U.S. broadcast journalists will prefer using the human interest frame, while U.S. government officials will more frequently use the issue/policy frame.

**Method**

This study analyzed the transcripts of sound bites which were found in U.S. broadcast news reporting during the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. In order to compare the issues and frames emphasized by three groups of political elites (U.S. government officials, U.S. TV journalists and rogue state leaders), this study examined the original texts of sound bites from these elite groups. Data collection was done in two ways.

First, to collect the sound bites of U.S. officials as part of a TV news report, the transcripts of news stories from NBC and CNN were retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database, using “United Nations” as the keyword. The time period searched was from Sept. 15, 2009 (the opening day of the 64th session of the UN Assembly) to Sept. 29, 2009 (when the 64th session’s final debate ended). The search yielded 196 news articles. By identifying the U.S officials’ sound bites relating to the UN General Assembly, we were able to collect and analyze 56 sound bites of high-ranking U.S. officials. These sound bites were mostly statements by President Obama, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and UN Ambassador Susan Rice during the 64th session of the General Assembly. Each sound bite containing an official’s statement was analyzed as a unit of analysis.

Second, to collect the sound bites of American TV journalists and rogue state leaders, transcripts from U.S. TV journalists’ interviews with Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi were obtained from the Lexis-Nexis database. The time period was the same as that of the U.S. officials’ sound bites. Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi were
both interviewed on Larry King Live between Sept. 15 and Sept. 29, 2009. Ahmadinejad was also interviewed by NBC’s Ann Curry on Sept. 17, 2009, CBS’s anchorwoman Katie Couric on Sept. 23, 2009 and PBS’s Charlie Rose on Sept. 28, 2009. Among these interview transcripts, each question or answer was chosen as a unit of analysis. As a result, the number of sound bites chosen for analysis featuring U.S. journalists was 121. The total number of sound bites by Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi was 124.

**Coding**

Each sound bite was coded in three ways, depending upon how international conflicts as well as the rogue states and their leaders were portrayed. The coding categories were developed by extensively reviewing the news stories covering the 64th session of the UN General Assembly and examining previous framing studies of public issues (Kim, 2000; Kim et al., 2010, 2011; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

First, the major issues described in each sound bite were coded into the following categories: (1) weapons of mass destruction, (2) the Afghan war, (3) the Lockerbie bombing and Gaddafi, (4) the Iran election and democracy in rogue states, (5) the Iraq War, (6) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (7) the Holocaust, (8) the duties of UN members, (9) President Obama, (10) U.S.’ responsibilities, (11) the UN’s role in international affairs and (12) Other.\(^1\)

Second, each sound bite was classified according to who is responsible for a specific controversial issue and was coded as (1) rogue states and their leaders, (2) the U.S. and its leaders (e.g., President Obama or President Bush), (3) England, France and Israel, (4) news media, (5) all countries and the UN, (6) Iranian dissidents and (7) Other.\(^2\). For example, if the topic is Iran’s nuclear armaments and incurring international criticism, it was coded as blaming a rogue state. On the other hand, if the topic is...
how the U.S. is infringing on Iran’s sovereignty, it was coded as accusing the U.S. If it was not clear who should be responsible, it was coded as “Other.”

Third, issue-specific frame was coded into five categories: (1) human interest frame, (2) issue/policy frame, (3) conflict frame, (4) morality frame and (5) other ³. The human interest frame focuses on the human aspect of a story or an emotional angle in order to catch the reader or viewer’s eye. The issue/policy frame refers to the significance or outcome of certain policies. The conflict frame emphasizes conflicts among parties, groups and/or individuals (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). This frame focuses on disagreements between countries or leaders. The morality frame deals with the issue from a moral perspective.

Coding was done separately by the author of this study and by a graduate student in mass communication. Wimmer and Dominick (2003) recommend that a sample of 10-25% of stories is sufficient to establish inter-coder reliability. In this study, 11% of the stories were used to establish inter-coder reliability. The following results were obtained from this process, using Cohen’s Kappa which corrects for agreement by chance: Issues frame (.85), Responsibility frame (.75) and Issue-specific frame (.69). Landis and Koch (1997) claim that Cohen’s kappa figures of between 0.61 and 0.81 are acceptable for any quantitative research.

Findings

Selection of Issues (RQ1)

RQ 1: What kinds of issues did U.S. officials, American broadcast journalists and the leaders of rogue states emphasize during the 64th session of the UN General Assembly?

RQ1 examined what kinds of issues three political elite groups — U.S. officials, American TV journalists and the leaders of

³ Other means a case in which a sound bite does present no pre-defined issue-specific frame or several issue-specific frames at the same time.
rogue states — emphasized in their public statements. Table 1 shows that there is a significant difference in the ways the three elite groups stressed the major issues during the 64th session of the General Assembly ($\chi^2 (df=22)=82.245, \ p<.01$).

Table 1: Issues Emphasized by Three Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>U.S. Gov’t (n = 56)</th>
<th>U.S. Journalists (n = 121)</th>
<th>Rogue State Leaders (n = 124)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan War</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine conflict</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty as UN member</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US’ Responsibility</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN’s role</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran’s election</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockerbie bombing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Obama</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (df = 22) = 82.245, \ p < .01$

In the statements by U.S. officials, 48% of the sound bites were coded in the category of nuclear weapon armament, while the U.S. broadcast journalists and rogue state leaders selected this category at a rate of 24% and 20%, respectively (Table 1).
are also some notable differences between the government officials’ statements, on the one hand, and statements by broadcast journalists and rogue state leaders, on the other hand (Table 1). For example, while U.S. officials put more emphasis on Iran’s nuclear armaments and the Afghan war than on other issues, the U.S. broadcast journalists and the leaders of rogue states highlighted three issues (nuclear weapons, Iranian elections and the Lockerbie bombing) more evenhandedly.

**Attribution of Responsibility (H1)**

**H1:** U.S. officials and journalists will assign the responsibility for conflicts to rogue states, while the leaders of rogue states will frame the West, including the U.S., as being responsible.

The findings show that there are significant differences in the attribution of responsibility among the public statements presented by U.S. officials, American journalists and rogue state leaders (Table 2, $\chi^2 (df=12)=233.323$, $p<.01$).

**Table 2: Responsibility Frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>U.S. Gov’t n=56</th>
<th>U.S. Journalists n=121</th>
<th>Rogue State Leaders n=124</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rogue states</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries &amp; UN</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England, France, Israel</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. &amp; its leaders</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News media</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian dissidents</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (df=12) = 233.323$, $p < .01$
U.S. journalists and officials attributed terrorism to rogue states and their leaders by ratios of 74% and 46%, respectively. By contrast, rogue state leaders most prominently blamed the U.S. and its leaders in 23% of the sound bites. They also frequently attributed responsibility to Iranian dissidents and Western news media, as shown in Table 2.

The three groups of political elites have significant differences in their presentation of the responsibility frame, and thus H1 is supported. As Table 3 shows, American officials and journalists mostly accused the rogue states and their leaders (officials, 46%; journalists, 74%).

Table 3: Responsibility Frame by U.S. Officials and Rogue State Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>U.S. Gov’t (n = 56)</th>
<th>U.S. Journalists (n = 121)</th>
<th>Rogue State Leaders (n = 124)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>46%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West &amp; U.S.</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² (df = 4) = 155.058, p < .01.

By contrast, the leaders of rogue states prominently accused the West, including the U.S., England and France, as being responsible (36%) (Table 3, χ²(df=4)=155.058, p<.01).

**Issue-Specific Frame (H2)**

**H 2:** Among the issue-specific frames, U.S. broadcast journalists will prefer using the human interest frame, while U.S. government officials will more frequently use the issue/policy frame.
The findings show that there is a significant difference in the employment of issue-specific frames by U.S. officials and U.S. journalists (Table 4, $\chi^2(df=4)=21.003$, $p<.01$).

Table 4: Issue-specific Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>U.S. Gov’t Officials (n = 56)</th>
<th>TV Journalists (n = 121)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue/policy</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human interest</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (df = 4) = 21.003, p<.01$.

Among the statements by U.S. officials, only 4% used the human interest frame, while 33% of the sound bites by U.S. journalists applied the human interest frame. However, U.S. officials presented the issue/policy frame more prominently than did U.S. journalists (71% vs. 56%). The findings support H2; there is a significant difference in the usage of both the human interest frame and the issue/policy frame between U.S. officials and journalists (Table 5, $\chi^2(df=2)=20.583$, $p<.01$).

Discussion

**Fears of Terrorism from Rogue States**

This study shows that the overall selection of issues by U.S. government officials and broadcast journalists follows a similar trend. Almost half (48%) of the U.S. officials’ formal statements on foreign affairs deal with concern over Iran’s nuclear arma-
ments. Similarly, the issue of Iran’s nuclear armaments was the primary issue (24%) emphasized by the U.S. journalists. The findings indicate that Iran’s nuclear armament program was one of the key themes which U.S. journalists tried to highlight in interviews with Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and Libyan’s leader Gaddafi. More importantly, the findings show that American journalists regarded Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear armaments as a serious concern because of the possible threat to world peace and stability. This study illustrates that the key theme encompassing U.S. officials’ statements and the storylines found on U.S. TV is fears of terrorism originating from rogue states.

**The News Media’s Emphasis on Humanitarian Issues**

The findings also indicate that the Obama government officials put an emphasis on policy-related issues, such as Iran’s nuclear armament, the Afghan war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the U.S. journalists are more attentive in the democratization movements and human rights issues within the territories of the so-called rogue states than are U.S. officials. Specifically, in the interviews with Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi, the U.S. journalists highlighted Iran’s elections (28%), the Lockerbie bombing (17%) and the [denial of the] Holocaust (7%)
as prominent themes. However, such issues are rarely mentioned in statements by U.S. government officials.

In particular, U.S. journalists repeatedly spotlighted the Iranian government’s crackdown on its citizens. CNN’s Larry King (2009) asked President Ahmadinejad, “Didn’t it concern you that these people were complaining that this was fraud?” CBS’ Katie Couric (2009) brought up the story of the 27-year-old woman named Neda, who was shot to death during the protests. She challenged, “Here is a shot of that cell phone picture, which I’m sure you’ve seen. Correct? What would you say to her family?”

American journalists also underscored the PanAm Flight 103 incident, in which a civilian plane was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing 190 Americans. The convicted bomber was released from prison in Scotland in August 2009. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs criticized Libya’s cheering, flag-waving welcome of the bomber, calling it “outrageous and disgusting” (CBS, 2009). Iran’s President Ahmadinejad was also criticized for his denial of the Holocaust. Ahmadinejad asserted at Tehran University at the end of an annual anti-Israel “Qods (Jerusalem) Day” rally that “The pretext [the Holocaust] for the creation of the Zionist regime (Israel) is false…. It is a lie based on an unprovable and mythical claim” (Hafezi & Sedarat, 2009). It seemed likely that the U.S. journalists wanted to convey Ahmadinejad’s provocative views about the Holocaust to their viewers.

The U.S. journalists’ emphasis on Iran’s election, the Lockerbie bombing and its denial of the Holocaust might have also come from the journalists’ judgment that those issues have high news value, because they contain humanitarian interest or concerns. This study does not claim that these issues became important agendas in American society because of the framing by American TV journalists during the 2009 General Assembly sessions. However, undoubtedly, the U.S. journalists highlighted those humanitarian issues than other policy issues.

The findings show that U.S. journalists’ interviews of rogue state leaders seemed not only to lay rogue states’ leaders open to attack, but also to bring up human and moral issues. Broadcasting is basically an intimate medium that “invites a personal, self-
disclosing style” (Jamieson, 1988, p. 84). It tends to rely on anecdotes and personal disclosure, since it is effective in facilitating emotional connections with its audience (Levasseur, et al., 2011). Television can enhance “a process which produces group cohesion and transform audience members into agents of change” (Dow & Tonn, 1993, p. 289). As shown in the findings of this study, American TV journalists framed international conflicts by focusing on humanitarian and moral components through their interviews with rogue state leaders on their news programs.

This study also shows that, while the U.S. president and government officials have more power to bring up a certain issue or frame in the national debate, television’s face-to-face interview programs can also have the capabilities to present some frames as substantial public issues. In this respect, the media do not stop mirroring or indexing the opinion of public officials and elite groups, as is claimed by indexing theory. Rather, as Entman’s cascading activation model suggests, the news media might have independent and critical functions by reflecting the voices of social activists or civil organizations or by imposing their autonomous views on the processes of frame building. In the post-Cold War era, the news media’s capacities to cultivate their independent frames might have expanded, as Entman (2003, 2004) claims.

Divergent Attribution of Responsibility

This paper also deals with the extent to which the attribution of responsibility plays out in the coverage of the rogue states and their leaders. The attribution of responsibility “presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solutions to either government or to an individual or group” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). Attributing responsibility to the other side entails suspecting or assailing the other side’s positions and morality. Our findings indicate that U.S. officials and journalists questioned the rogue state leaders’ unaccountable attitudes, whereas the rogue state leaders criticized the West as being at the root of conflicts among other countries.
When President Ahmadinejad was questioned about his denial of the Holocaust by Larry King, he defended himself repeatedly blaming Israel, the U.S. and the Western news media. He said, “Why is it that the Palestinian people should be, uh, subjected to genocide?” and “Unfortunately, my work has been distorted by the media” (King, 2009). He also emphasized, in his interview with CBS’s Katie Couric (2009), that “So what does this have to do with the Palestinian people?” Especially, whenever Ahmadinejad was asked about his government’s crackdown on dissidents, opposition leaders and journalists after the election in June 2009, he attributed the street demonstrations and the democratization movement to some radical dissidents and to Western countries. He answered as follows: “We are very sorry that one of our fellow citizens has been killed…as a victim of an agitational circumstance. An agitation that was carried out with the support of some American politicians, the Voice of America and the BBC that actually promoted these agitations” (Couric, 2009).

Thus, there was, to some degree, “a clash of frames” between American officials and journalists, on the one hand, and rogue state leaders, on the other. The U.S. officials and journalists ascribed terrorism to rogue states. In his interview with Gaddafi, Larry King (2009) mentioned that “By the mid-1980s, Gaddafi was treated as a pariah by many in the West, accused of bankrolling terrorist activities around the globe.” In a video clip, Larry King Live aired former President Ronald Reagan’s statement, “Mr. Gaddafi must know that we will hold him fully accountable for any such actions” (King, 2009).

In contrast, the rogue state leaders claimed that the responsibility for terrorism should be put on the U.S. and other Western countries such as France and England. In the interview with CNN’s Larry King Live, President Ahmadinejad counterattacked: “Now, nobody can forget how Mr. Tony Blair encouraged Mr. Bush to carry out militaristic actions. Were the measures taken in favor of the United States of America? Were they in favor of the world? Do they benefit the world?” (King, 2009). The findings show that now that the Cold War has ended, terrorism has become another point of collision and confrontation among the nations of the world.
Officials’ Preference for the Issue/Policy Frame

American officials and journalists used somewhat differently issue-specific frames which referred to the point of view through which an issue is presented. American officials presented the issue/policy frame more often than did TV journalists. It is probable that U.S. officials employed the issue-policy frame not only to indicate logical flaws in the rogue states’ foreign policies, but also to emphasize their own positions’ superiority over rogue states’ policies. However, the U.S. journalists conspicuously used the human interest frame more than the issue/policy frame. This human interest frame stressed the inhumane and irresponsible attitudes of those leaders.

In the television interviews with rogue state leaders, the journalists and the leaders exchanged verbal condemnations by raising human rights issues. In some respects, the interviews with the rogue state leaders were intended to subject them to a grilling by asking questions which would be uncomfortable to them. The interviewers’ questions were more likely to contain human interest perspectives than issue/policy perspectives. On the other hand, the government officials’ statements were likely to use issue/policy frames in order that their foreign policies could be seen to be based on rational and balanced judgment.

This study has some limitations. First, it did not look into how the government frames caused the media frames and how the news media frames shaped public opinion about the rogue states and their political leaders. Thus, it cannot claim to have found evidence of causal influence from the government to the media and the public. Second, this study was not able to provide a clear idea of why the U.S. government officials, the U.S. journalists and the rogue state leaders more frequently employed some frames over other frames. In future studies, it would be useful to conduct a survey of journalists covering foreign issues. In spite of these limitations, this study provides a good opportunity to show not only how the frame-building by officials and journalists about rogue state leaders plays out, but also how the frames between the West and the rogue states clash in worldwide forums such as the General Assembly meetings.
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A ‘Tidal Wave of Revolt: ‘How World Editorials Framed the 2011 Egyptian Revolution

By Yu-li Chang & Dale E. Zacher

This article first examined how the world editorials framed the Egyptian uprising by looking into three aspects of framing analysis --- causal responsibility, moral judgment and treatment responsibility. It then investigated how three extrinsic factors in international communication research -- political freedom, religion and geopolitical regions affected the frames. Most editorials framed the Egyptian uprising in this way: It was mainly caused by the political woes inherent with the Mubarak dictatorship; it served as a moral lesson in that the uprising could trigger political, social or economic repercussions in other countries, especially countries with dictators; and Egypt’s future could be secured by the new government starting democratic reforms immediately. The three extrinsic factors examined in this study affected in various degrees how the editorials framed the Egyptian uprising, especially in moral judgment – the lessons to be learned from the events in Egypt.

The uprising caused by a young man’s immolation in Tunisia in late 2010 not only toppled the Ben Ali dictatorship but also awakened millions of Egyptians to rise up against their dictator, Hosni Mubarak. This tidal wave of revolt drew the world’s attention to Egypt. As the Cyprus Mail opined:

When a young vegetable seller in a provincial Tunisian town doused himself in petrol and burned himself to death after police seized his cart back in December, no one would have

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thought this act of despair would unleash a tidal wave of revolt across the Arab world. In just a few weeks, the protests sparked by his death had overthrown President Ben Ali in Tunisia, sweeping away his cronies and much of the old regime. Now copy cat demonstrations in Egypt --- the region’s most populous state and bellwether of political trends --- have brought President Mubarak to the brink (“Arab Democracy Need Not Threaten Western Interests,” February 6, 2011).

As this editorial from the *Cyprus Mail* newspaper noted, the swift current of political change in the Middle East that became known as the “Arab Spring” surprised most observers, especially when it came to the streets of Egypt. Within 18 days, a people-power uprising in Egypt ended President Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year dictatorship. Fueled by basic demands for political freedom, calls for respect of human rights and a revulsion against the corrupt dictatorship, protestors took only 18 days from late January to early February 2011 to win the Egyptian army’s support and force Mubarak to abdicate his presidency.

Mass demonstrations against the Mubarak regime began on Cairo’s Tahrir Square on January 25. Because of the scope of this uprising and its implications for regional and world politics, the Egyptian uprising drew a great deal of media attention from around the world. As the world audience struggled to understand the unexpected turn of events, journalists moved quickly to provide meaning by analyzing and interpreting the causes of this uprising, solutions to the crisis and lessons to be learned from this event. While journalists may or may not realize that their interpretations help “frame” the uprising in certain ways (Gamson, 1989), political scientist Entman (2004) has pointed out that “framing is an inescapable feature of representation and that increases the political influence of the media” (p. 21). In addition, framing strategies should be most explicit in political editorials because they are written to express opinions on important issues without being bound by the conventional norm of objectivity (Chang & Chang, 2003; Eilder & Lüter, 2000; Gamson, 1989).

The purpose of this study is first to determine what frames were used by the world’s English-language newspaper editori-
als to interpret the Egyptian uprising to their readers. Instead of focusing on certain newspapers from a handful of countries such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc., this study takes a broader approach by including English-language newspapers from all over the world. The reason is mainly because the “Arab Spring” has become a movement that has commanded media attention from every corner of the world, and the future development of this movement will have profound impact on global politics. English-language newspapers are chosen because English is the lingua franca of the world and their readers include the expatriates and the elite, diplomatic community, and in some cases government ministerial overseers, who all serve as opinion leaders; therefore, these papers are often among a nation’s most influential (Merrill, 1991; van Leeuwen, 2006). In addition, these newspapers also symbolize or showcase their countries to the world stage (Messner & Garrison, 2006).

This study also aims to provide some understanding into what factors might have affected the frames world editorials used to analyze the Egyptian revolution. Scheufele (1999, p. 115) referred to this step of investigation as frame building, in which “the key question is what kinds of organizational or structural factors of the media system, or which individual characteristics of journalists, can impact the framing of news content.” Rather than investigating these micro-level factors, this study borrows concepts from international communication research, in which macro-level extrinsic factors such as geographic proximity, language ties, political system, political freedom, etc. have been investigated. Due to the political nature of the Egyptian uprising, this study will examine the following political factors: political freedom, religion and geopolitical region.

Theoretical Framework

**Using Framing to Study World Opinion**

Most framing studies distinguished between two types of frames — media or news frames and audience or individual frames (Druckman, 2001; Scheufele, 1999). Media frames refer to “attributes of the news itself,” while audience frames refer
to “information-processing schemata” of individuals (Entman, 1991, p. 7). In other words, mass media actively set the frames of reference that readers use to interpret and discuss news events, and the way media frame certain issues can affect people’s perceptions of those issues and influence public opinions (Eilders & Lüter, 2000; Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Tuchman, 1978). At the same time, audiences process the media’s frames of reference using preexisted meaning structures or schemas (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1991; Friedland & Zhong, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Gamson, 1992; Kosicki & McLeod, 1990) or individuals’ general personality traits (Matthes, 2009). Individual frames, according to McLeod et al. (Cited in Schuettele, 1999), describe how the audience makes sense of political news and are defined as cognitive devices that “operate as non-hierarchical categories that serve as forms of major headings into which any future news content can be filed” (p. 10).

This study investigated only the news frames. A news frame can be defined as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events…. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p.143), or as working routines for journalists or news organizations to organize, interpret and present information for efficient relay to their audience (Entman, 1993; Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Framing theory suggests that journalists use news frames to simplify, prioritize and structure the narrative flow of events. By selecting to prioritize some facts or developments of an event over others, journalists promote a particular interpretation of that event (Entman, 1993). Pan and Kosicki (2005) also stated that in newspapers writers have limited space to get their ideas across, so “framing” an issue capitalizes on the fact that readers hold distinctive values and strive for coherent understanding of that issue. In short, media framing studies examine “the selection and salience of certain aspects of an issue by exploring images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors and messages” (Matthes, 2009, p. 349).

Matthes (2009), after conducting a comprehensive study of media framing research, found that Entman’s (1993) definition of media frames was the most influential among various definitions.
of framing. Entman (1993) defined “media frames” as referring to some aspects of a perceived reality made more salient in a communication text to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). In other words, news framing in the media’s coverage of political events has four basic functions -- defining the problem, identifying causes, conveying moral judgment and prescribing remedies (Entman, 2004). In a similar line of thinking, Snow and Benford (1988) said that a political story line is often organized through diagnostic and prognostic framing. A diagnostic frame deals with identification of the problem and attribution of causal responsibility. A prognostic frame suggests the remedy to an issue.

Using Entman’s (1993, 2004) definition of news framing, this study first examined three aspects of framing, namely: (1) assigning causal responsibility, (2) stating a moral judgment and (3) suggesting a treatment remedy in reaction to the event. In other words, three questions were asked: What did the world’s newspaper editorials say caused the uprising? What lessons did they say could be learned from Egypt’s experience? What did they say should be done now that Egypt had ousted its long-standing dictator?

**Using Editorials with Framing Analysis**

This study used editorials instead of news reports because political “framing” is most obvious in editorials. Gamson (1989, p. 158) argued that to “identify frames, the information content of news reports is less important than interpretative commentary that surrounds it.” The distinction between news and editorials corresponds with the distinction between information knowledge and opinion. News reports are represented by the newspaper’s interpretation of reality based on factual accounts or summaries of events; editorials express opinions and give evaluations of reality or map the reality for their readers (Rupar, 2007). Reese (2007, p. 148) also noted that “framing suggests more intentionality on the part of the framer and relates more explicitly to political strategy.” Editorials are the only place in a
newspaper where the views of the paper as an organization are represented. In freely selecting and presenting issues according to their own agenda, editorials take an active role in engaging the public in the deliberations and discourse of politics (Firmstone, 2008).

Because editorials are written to express opinions and are intended to lead mass opinion, the ideas, positions and arguments articulated or “framed” by editorial writers have the potential to structure the thoughts of a wider public. Therefore, editorial opinions constitute an area of research that can make a significant contribution to our understanding of the relationship between the press and politics (Chang & Chang, 2003; Eilder & Lüter, 2000; Firmstone, 2008; Rojecki, 2008; Ryan, 2004).

Using Theory and Methods from International Communication Research

In a global media event like the Egyptian uprising, theory and methodology related to international news coverage can help us understand what factors might have affected the editorials’ framing of the protests. International communication scholars have studied two lines of factors affecting international news coverage: “intrinsic” or “event-related” factors, referring to newsworthiness of the event such as human interest, deviance, prominence/importance, conflict/controversy, timeliness and proximity (Chang et al, 1987; Cooper-Chen, 2001; Wanta & Chang, 2001) and “extrinsic” or “context-related” factors, referring to extra-media components such as trade relations, diplomatic and military ties, cultural similarities, or political variables (Adams, 1986; Ahern, 1984; Gaddy & Tanjong, 1986; Ishii, 1996; Kim & Barnett, 1996; Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1980; Robinson & Sparkes, 1976; Rosengren, 1974, 1977; Wu, 2000).

Among the extrinsic factors, political variables such as political freedom and press freedom were found to be strong predictors of international news coverage (Ahern, 1984; Kim & Barnett, 1996; Robinson & Sparkes, 1976; Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1980). Chang and Chang (2003) also found religion as a factor of international editorials’ coverage of the September 11 attacks. Other
factors were also found to be good predictors, but in an inconsistent manner. Kim and Barnett’s (1996) findings supported geographical proximity and language ties as determinants of international news flow. Adams (1986), analyzing the nightly U.S. television coverage of 35 natural disasters around the world, concluded that where the earthquake occurred made a big difference. The effect of geographic proximity did not surface in Chang et al.’s (2000), Cooper-Chen’s (2001), Gaddy and Tanjong’s (1986), Ishii’s (1996) and Wu’s (2000) studies, however.

Due to the political nature of the Egyptian uprising, this study focused on three political variables -- degree of political freedom, religion and geopolitical region. Geopolitical region was added as a variable because countries in a region often share some common religious, political or ethnic origins and often share similar strategic interests. The Arab Spring itself shows how ideas can spread through a geopolitical region. The mass protests in Egypt gained momentum after Tunisia ousted its president in the Jasmine Revolution. The uprising in Egypt likewise was widely regarded as a possible catalyst for reforms in the Middle East, where similar problems existed after decades of authoritarian rule and economic stagnation.

**Research Questions**

This study includes two sets of data – a content analysis of frames based on the world’s English-language editorials and extrinsic factors related to international communication research. This study seeks to answer these two research questions:

**RQ 1:** What were the frames used by English-language newspaper editorials from 43 countries in the following aspects: causal responsibility, moral judgment and treatment responsibility?

**RQ 2:** What factors, including political freedom, religion and geopolitical region, may have affected how these editorials framed the Egyptian uprising?
Method

Sampling

Content analysis was used to examine the frames used by the world’s newspaper editorials in response to the massive demonstrations in Egypt in January and February 2011. World editorials in English were drawn from the Lexis-Nexis Academic database using the search words “Egypt” and “editorials” with the dates set between January 25, the beginning of the protests, and February 15, three days after the fall of Mubarak. Editorials were also drawn from the World Press Review website, which provides links to newspapers around the world, and from Google by searching English-language newspapers in a certain country. Most newspaper websites would allow archival search of editorials or display editorials published several weeks or even months before; some, however, do not have these functions. In such cases, the researchers had to forego those newspapers.

Only articles identified as editorials were collected; regular news stories, news analysis pieces or other opinion pieces were excluded. This means that all opinion columns with the author’s byline were left out. For countries such as the United States, Britain, Canada and South Africa with larger numbers of English-language newspapers, only four newspapers from each of these countries (16 total) were chosen for analysis. Those chosen had the largest circulations and had at least a national focus in their coverage. They were also chosen because of their availability online. After eliminating those articles that mentioned Egypt but were not related to the uprising, 190 editorials representing 43 countries were retained for analysis. All but four were originally published in English. The four non-English articles were translated into English by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.

Twenty-six editorials were drawn from Africa, representing seven countries -- Kenya (n = 5), Namibia (n = 1), Nigeria (n = 3), South Africa (n = 14), Tanzania (n = 1), Uganda (n = 1) and Zambia (n = 1). Asia contained 55 editorials represented by 16 countries -- Afghanistan (n = 1), Australia (n = 6), Bangladesh (n = 1),
China (including Hong Kong) (n = 5), India (n = 9), Indonesia (n = 1), Japan (n = 2), Korea (n = 1), New Zealand (n = 1), Malaysia (n = 2), Pakistan (n = 7), the Philippines (n = 1), Singapore (n = 3), Sri Lanka (n = 6), Taiwan (n = 2) and Thailand (n = 7). Thirty-four editorials came out of Europe, representing eight countries -- Bulgaria (n = 1), Cyprus (n = 2), Ireland (n = 10), Lithuania (n = 1), Malta (n = 3), Portugal (n = 1), Turkey (n = 2) and the United Kingdom (n = 14). Thirty editorials were drawn from seven countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Egypt (n = 2), Israel (n = 4), Lebanon (n = 10), Qatar (n = 7), Saudi Arabia (n = 4), Yemen (n = 2) and United Arab Emirates (n = 1). The Americas were represented by 45 editorials from five countries -- Canada (n = 13), Trinidad and Tobago (n = 2), Jamaica (n = 1), Guyana (n = 3) and the United States (n = 26).

**Editorial Frames**

This study dealt with issue-specific frames -- frames that are specific to the Egyptian uprising and, therefore, may not apply to other issues. These issue-specific frames were derived by following Matthes’ (2009) suggestion of conducting an initial exploratory analysis of a sample of the world’s editorials.

**Causal Responsibility.** This variable referred to the editorial’s opinions about the cause or causes of the Egyptian uprising. Some articles mentioned the lack of freedom and the abuse of power under the 30-year rule of Mubarak. Some editorials covered aspects of a failing economy that brought plight to the public --- rising food prices, widespread poverty and mass unemployment. Others blamed the United States for propping up the Mubarak regime by pumping billions of dollars of aid to Egypt and ignoring its human-rights record in exchange of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Of course, some editorials mentioned a combination of these causes. Four categories of causal responsibility were used for this study: (1) domestic political woes inherent with dictatorship, (2) domestic economic woes, (3) international, especially U.S., complicity and (4) other.
Moral Judgment. This variable referred to the editorial’s stance on what can be learned from the mass protests from Egypt. Some emphasized that this uprising meant corrupt or unresponsive governments ultimately fail, that governments must listen to the people or that change is inevitable. Some editorials thought that the Egyptian uprising served as a model for non-violent social change or as a demonstration of people power demanding change from within. Some editorials focused on the hypocrisy or showed distrust of the West, especially American foreign policy toward the Middle East and demanded policy readjustment. The category of “self-reflections” also appeared in many editorials. It connected the lesson learned from Egypt to the editorial’s country of origin, the country’s response to the Egyptian uprising, or the uprising’s effects on the editorial’s country of origin. In summary, six categories fell under the moral responsibility variable: (1) corrupt governments ultimately fail, (2) Egypt as a model for non-violent social change, (3) watch out for ripple effects in other countries, (4) U.S. policy toward the Middle East needs readjustment, (5) self-reflection and (6) other.

Treatment Responsibility. This variable looked into the editorials’ opinions about what can be done to bring solutions to the Egyptian crisis. Some editorials asserted that the solution lay in immediate reforms that could lead to democracy, or they expressed trust that the new government was able to assure peaceful transition to democracy. Some editorials viewed solving economic problems inherent or due to the unrest as the answer to the crisis. Some editorials encouraged the international community, especially the United States, to get involved to help Egypt rebuild. While some editorials lobbied for the involvement of the international community in helping shape the future of Egypt, others warned against international involvement on the grounds that what was happening was an internal affair and should be treated as such by the international community. A few editorials also warned against hasty democratization because it takes time to build up the system for democracy to function well. Overall, six categories were generated for this variable:
(1) reform now or more toward self-government and democracy, (2) solve economic problems, (3) involve international community, especially the United States, (4) no international or U.S. involvement, (5) no hasty democratization and (6) other.

**Extrinsic Factors**

This study examined three extrinsic factors --- degree of political freedom, religion and geopolitical region.

**Political Freedom**: The level of political freedom in a country was determined by the Freedom House’s rankings of that nation’s political rights and civil liberties. Countries were categorized as “not free,” “partly free” and “free.”

**Religion**: Data on religion was obtained from the CIA’s *World Factbook*, which contains information of each country’s religious profile. In countries where multiple religions prevail, the religion with the highest percentage of believers was chosen to represent that country’s religion. The world religions are classified into five categories based on Religion on File 1990: Hinduism; Buddhism or other Asian religions, including Confucianism, Taoism, Shinto, Jainism, Sikhism; Judaism; Islam and Christianity, including Protestantism, Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox. Due to the limited number of editorials originated from countries with Hinduism as the dominant religion, this category was combined with Buddhism to become one category. Editorials originated from countries practicing Judaism were also few, therefore, this category was grouped together with Christianity. The reason for this kind of grouping is based on the historical connection between Buddhism and Hinduism and between Christianity and Judaism. Even though the number of editorials originated from atheist countries was low, too, this category was retained because it doesn’t make sense to group it with any other categories. In short, the religion variable contains four categories: “Buddhism and Hinduism,” “Christianity and Judaism,” “Islam” and “atheist.”
**Geopolitical Region:** Countries were grouped into five geopolitical regions by using the *World Press Review’s* classifications: Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa and the Americas.

**Statistical Procedures**

The study unit is the editorial. The recording unit is the entire editorial for the following variables: extrinsic variables, including level of political freedom, religion and geopolitical region; and framing variables related to whether an editorial assigned causal responsibility, gave moral judgment, or prescribed treatment remedy. The recording unit is the occurrence or mention of the references to variables under the categories of causal responsibility such as “political woes,” “economic woes” and “U.S. complicity”; moral judgment such as “corrupt governments ultimately failing,” “Egypt as a model for non-violent social change,” etc.; and treatment responsibility, including “starting reforms now,” “solving economic problems,” etc.

Two coders (the authors of this manuscript) coded 19 randomly selected articles (10% of all editorials) to test intercoder reliability on the framing variables. The results yielded 81% of agreement on causal responsibility assignment, 92% agreement on moral judgment and 80% agreement on treatment responsibility assignment. The overall agreement for the framing variables is 84%.

**Findings**

For this study, 190 editorials were found--- 26 (13.7%) from Africa, 55 (28.9%) from Asia, 34 (17.9%) from Europe, 30 (15.8%) from the Middle East and North Africa, and 45 (23.7%) from the Americas. If categorized by Freedom House rankings of the political freedom of the nations where the editorials originated, 22 (11.6%) were published in countries listed as “not free,” 50 (26.3%) in “partly free” countries, and 118 (62.1%) in “free” countries. Grouped by religion, the editorials yielded 29 (15.3%) from “Buddhist and Hindu” countries, 107 (56.3%) from “Christian and Judaic” countries, 44 (23.2%) from “Islamic” countries, and 10 (5.3%) from “atheist” countries.
Table 1: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Levels of Political Freedom Frame the Cause(s) of the Egyptian Revolt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation’s Political Freedom</th>
<th>Political/Dictatorship Problems</th>
<th>Economic Problems</th>
<th>Failed Foreign Policy esp. by U.S.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 186)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>9 (40.9%)</td>
<td>7 (31.8%)</td>
<td>5 (22.7%)</td>
<td>1 (4.5%)</td>
<td>22 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>25 (44.6%)</td>
<td>18 (32.1%)</td>
<td>12 (21.4%)</td>
<td>1 (1.8%)</td>
<td>56 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>54 (50.1%)</td>
<td>37 (34.3%)</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
<td>4 (3.7%)</td>
<td>108 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the 105 (55.3%) editorials that dealt with causal responsibility, there were 186 mentions of the causes in which “political woes inherent with dictatorship” took the lead (n = 88, % = 47.3), followed by “economic woes” (n = 62, % = 33.3) and “U.S. complicity” (n = 30, % = 16.1). A large number of articles (n = 158, % = 83.2) provided one or more moral judgments. Among the 293 mentions of moral judgment, 23.5% (n = 69) cautioned about “watching out for ripple effects in other countries,” 21.8% (n = 64) asserted that “corrupt or unresponsive governments ultimately fail,” and 17.4% (n = 51) dealt with “self-reflections.” Moral judgments on “U.S. or international policy toward Israel and the Middle East needs adjustment” and on “Egypt as a model of non-violent social change” accounted for 15.4% (n = 45) and 11.3% (n = 33) respectively. Almost two-thirds (n = 129, % = 67.9) of the editorials discussed treatment responsibility. Among the 173 mentions of treatment responsibility, 60.7% (n = 105) prescribed that “reform must start now or self-government/ democracy is the answer.” The treatment remedy of “international community, especially the U.S., needing to exercise influence or lend a helping hand” ranked second (n = 23, % = 13.3), and “solving economic problems” ranked third (n = 20, % = 11.6). “Let Egyptians decide their future without international interference (n =11, % = 6.4)” trailed behind other treatment remedies.
The frequency results, broken down by the level of political freedom in each country, showed that most attributed “political woes” as the dominant cause for the revolution (“not free” – 40.9%, “partly free” – 44.6%, “free” – 50.1%), followed by “economic woes” (“not free” – 31.8%, “partly free” – 32.1%, “free” – 34.3%).

When conveying moral judgments, “not free” and “partly free” countries mentioned “watch out for ripple effects in other countries” (“not free” – 27.5%, “partly free” – 23.9%) and “corrupt governments ultimately fail” (“not free” – 17.5%, “partly free” – 31.8%) as the two dominant lessons to be learned, while the “free” countries (n = 165) focused more on “watching out for ripple effects” (22.4%) and “self-reflections” (20.6%).

Table 2: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Levels of Political Freedom Frame the Moral Judgments to be Learned?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation’s Political Freedom</th>
<th>Corrupt Gov’ts Will Fail</th>
<th>Egypt is Model for Social Change</th>
<th>Watch for Ripple Effects in Other Nations</th>
<th>U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Egypt &amp; Mid-East. Must Change</th>
<th>Self-Reflection: Our Nation’s Response to Uprising or Its Effect on Our Nation</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 293)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (17.5%)</td>
<td>5 (12.5%)</td>
<td>11 (27.5%)</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>9 (22.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 (31.8%)</td>
<td>8 (9%)</td>
<td>21 (23.9%)</td>
<td>11 (12.5%)</td>
<td>15 (17%)</td>
<td>5 (5.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 (17.6%)</td>
<td>20 (12.1%)</td>
<td>37 (22.4%)</td>
<td>28 (17%)</td>
<td>34 (20.6%)</td>
<td>17 (10.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All groups of countries indicated “reform, self-government or democracy must start now” (“not free” – 33.3%, “partly free” – 57%, “free” – 66.1%) as the most important remedy for Egypt, but the emphasis on “reform or democracy” weighed much less in editorials from “not free” countries. For “not free” countries, “solving economic problems” (20%) and “no international interference” (20%) and “move slowly to democracy” (20%) were also regarded as important. Contrary to the emphasis on “no international interference” from “not free” (20%) and “partly free” (14.3%) countries, “free” countries suggested “international, especially U.S. involvement” (18.3%) as a treatment remedy.
Table 3: What did Editorials from Nations with Different levels of Political Freedom Suggest as Solutions/Treatments to the Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>5 (33.3%)</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>28 (57%)</td>
<td>10 (20.4%)</td>
<td>3 (6.1%)</td>
<td>7 (14.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>49 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>72 (66.1%)</td>
<td>7 (6.4%)</td>
<td>20 (18.3%)</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
<td>6 (5.7%)</td>
<td>3 (2.8%)</td>
<td>109 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grouped by religion, the editorials did not exhibit differences in their emphasis on causal responsibility. All regarded “political woes inherent with dictatorship” as the main cause (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 43.6%, “Christianity and Judaism” – 51%, “Islam” – 41.9%) and “economic woes” as the second cause (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 31.9%, “Christianity and Judaism” – 34.7%, “Islam” – 30.2%).

Table 4: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Religions Frame the Cause(s) of the Egyptian Revolt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation’s Religion</th>
<th>Political/Dictatorship Problems</th>
<th>Economic Problems</th>
<th>Failed Foreign Policy esp. by U.S.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 186)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism &amp; Hinduism</td>
<td>17 (43.6%)</td>
<td>12 (31.9%)</td>
<td>8 (20.5%)</td>
<td>2 (5.1%)</td>
<td>39 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity &amp; Judaism</td>
<td>50 (51%)</td>
<td>34 (34.7%)</td>
<td>12 (12.2%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>98 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>18 (41.9%)</td>
<td>13 (30.2%)</td>
<td>10 (23.3%)</td>
<td>2 (4.7%)</td>
<td>43 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the area of moral judgment, editorials originated from “Buddhist and Hindu” countries and “Islamic” countries focused on either “watch out for ripple effects” (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 29.2%, “Islam” – 24.1%) or “corrupt governments ultimately fail” (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 20.8%, “Islam” – 25.3%). Editorials from “Christian and Judaic” countries placed slightly more emphasis on “self-reflections” (23.5%) than on “watch out for ripple effects” (20.4%) and “corrupt governments ultimately fail” (20.4%).

Table 5: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Religions Frame the Moral Judgments to be Learned?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation’s Religion</th>
<th>Corrupt Gov’ts Will Fail</th>
<th>Egypt is Model for Social Change</th>
<th>Watch for Ripple Effects in Other Nations</th>
<th>U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Egypt &amp; Mid-East, Must Change</th>
<th>Self-Reflection: Our Nation’s Response to Uprising or Its Effect on Our Nation</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 293)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism &amp; Hinduism</td>
<td>10 (20.8%)</td>
<td>6 (12.5%)</td>
<td>14 (29.2%)</td>
<td>8 (16.7%)</td>
<td>4 (8.3%)</td>
<td>6 (12.5%)</td>
<td>48 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity &amp; Judaism</td>
<td>32 (20.4%)</td>
<td>16 (10.2%)</td>
<td>32 (20.4%)</td>
<td>26 (16.7%)</td>
<td>37 (23.5%)</td>
<td>14 (8.9%)</td>
<td>157 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>20 (25.3%)</td>
<td>11 (13.9%)</td>
<td>19 (24.1%)</td>
<td>10 (12.7%)</td>
<td>9 (11.4%)</td>
<td>10 (12.7%)</td>
<td>79 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>2 (22.2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (44.4%)</td>
<td>1 (11.1%)</td>
<td>1 (11.1%)</td>
<td>1 (11.1%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While all three groups of editorials regarded “swift political reform, self-government or democracy” (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 59.3%, “Christianity and Judaism” – 66%, “Islam” – 51.4%) as the most important treatment remedy for the Egyptian crisis, they had different ideas about the second remedy. “Buddhist and Hindu” countries emphasized “addressing economic problems” (18.5%). “Christian and Judaic” countries valued “providing international help, especially help from the United States” (18.4%). “Islamic” countries, however, chose “no international interference and let Egyptians decide” (20%).
Table 6: What did Editorials from Nations with Different Religion Suggest as Solutions/Treatments to the Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism &amp; Hinduism</td>
<td>16 (59.3%)</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>3 (11.1%)</td>
<td>2 (7.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (3.7%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity &amp; Judaism</td>
<td>68 (66%)</td>
<td>7 (6.8%)</td>
<td>19 (18.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
<td>6 (5.8%)</td>
<td>2 (1.9%)</td>
<td>103 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>18 (51.4%)</td>
<td>6 (17.1%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>7 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>2 (5.7%)</td>
<td>35 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>3 (37.5%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequency results, broken down into geopolitical regions, showed that editorials from all regions except the Middle East and North Africa attributed most of the causal responsibility to “political woes inherent with dictatorship” (“Africa” – 46.4%, “Asia” – 46.2%, “Europe” – 48.4%, “Americas” – 57.1%) and then to “economic woes” (“Africa” – 32.1%, “Asia” – 29.2%, “Europe” – 32.3%, “Americas” – 37.1%). Editorials from the Middle East and North Africa had slightly more mentions of “economic woes” (40.7%) than “political woes” (37%). Compared with the rest of the regions, editorials from the “Americas” had the fewest mentions of “failed U.S. foreign policy” as one of the causes (“Africa” – 21.4%, “Asia” – 20%, “Europe” – 12.9%, “Middle East and North Africa” – 18.5%, “Americas” – 5.7%).

The editorials from different geopolitical regions did frame moral responsibility differently. For “Africa,” “corrupt governments” (34.1%) and “self-reflections” (29.3%) topped the chart. For “Asia,” the “Middle East and North Africa,” “ripple effects” had the most mentions (“Asia” – 28.7%, “Middle East and North Africa” – 23.9%), followed by “corrupt governments” (“Asia” – 22.3%, “Middle East and North Africa” – 21.7%). “Europe” also put the most emphasis on “ripple effects” (28.3%), but “U.S. or international policy toward the Middle East needs readjustment” (19.6%) ranked second. The “Americas” contained 33.3% dealing with “self-reflections” and 18.2% with “ripple effects.”
Table 7: How did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions Frame the Cause(s) of the Egyptian Revolt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Political/Dictatorship Problems</th>
<th>Economic Problems</th>
<th>Failed Foreign Policy esp. by U.S.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 186)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>13 (46.4%)</td>
<td>9 (32.1%)</td>
<td>6 (21.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>30 (46.2%)</td>
<td>19 (29.2%)</td>
<td>13 (20%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>65 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>15 (48.4%)</td>
<td>10 (32.3%)</td>
<td>4 (12.9%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-East</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>11 (40.7%)</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>20 (57.1%)</td>
<td>13 (37.1%)</td>
<td>2 (5.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: How did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions Frame Moral Judgments to be Learned from the Egyptian Revolt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Corrupt Gov’ts Will Fail</th>
<th>Egypt is Model for Social Change</th>
<th>Watch for Ripple Effects in Other Nations</th>
<th>U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Egypt &amp; Mid-East Must Change</th>
<th>Self-Reflection: Our Nation’s Response to Uprising or Its Effect on Our Nation</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 293)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14 (34.1%)</td>
<td>1 (2.4%)</td>
<td>6 (14.6%)</td>
<td>3 (7.3%)</td>
<td>12 (29.3%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>21 (22.3%)</td>
<td>12 (12.8%)</td>
<td>27 (28.7%)</td>
<td>15 (16%)</td>
<td>10 (10.6%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>94 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>8 (17.4%)</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
<td>13 (28.3%)</td>
<td>9 (19.6%)</td>
<td>5 (10.8%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-East</td>
<td>10 (21.7%)</td>
<td>7 (15.2%)</td>
<td>11 (23.9%)</td>
<td>7 (15.2%)</td>
<td>2 (4.3%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>11 (16.7%)</td>
<td>7 (10.6%)</td>
<td>12 (18.2%)</td>
<td>11 (16.7%)</td>
<td>22 (33.3%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While all geopolitical regions put “political reform, self-government or democracy” as the priority for treatment responsibility (“Africa” – 73.3%, “Asia” – 62.2%, “Europe” – 67.6%, the “Americas” – 63.5%), “Middle East and North Africa” contained the lowest percentage (37%). The second most important treatment for “Africa,” “Asia,” the “Middle East and North Africa” went to “addressing economic problems,” even though the percentages were not high (“Africa” – 13.3%, “Asia” – 15.5%, “Middle East and North Africa” – 22.2%). For “Europe” and the “Americas,” their editorials emphasized “international help, especially from the United States” as the second most important treatment remedy (“Europe” – 26.5%, “Americas” – 17.3%).

Table 9: What did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions Suggest as Solutions/Treatments to the Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Swift Move to Democratic Self-Government</th>
<th>Economic Problems Must be Addressed</th>
<th>International Help, esp. U.S. needed</th>
<th>No International Interference. Let Egyptians Decide</th>
<th>Move Slowly to Democracy. Build on Existing Institutions</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total (n = 173)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>11 (73.3%)</td>
<td>2 (13.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (13.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>28 (62.2%)</td>
<td>7 (15.5%)</td>
<td>4 (8.9%)</td>
<td>3 (6.7%)</td>
<td>2 (4.4%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>23 (67.6%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>9 (26.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-East</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>6 (22.2%)</td>
<td>1 (3.7%)</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>3 (11.1%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>33 (63.5%)</td>
<td>4 (7.7%)</td>
<td>9 (17.3%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
<td>3 (5.8%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

The 190 world editorials selected for this study framed the Egyptian uprising as mainly caused by “domestic political woes inherent with the dictatorship” of Mubarak’s 30-year rule. These editorials argued that the imposition of emergency law, lack of freedom, abuse by police and security forces, rigged elections and possible succession of Mubarak’s son all contributed to the uprising in Egypt. These editorials also attributed the causal
responsibility to “domestic economic woes” for a large percentage of the Egyptian population who earned less than $2 a day and for the youth who had education but could not find employment. The failed economic policy that only benefited the rich and enlarged the gap between the rich and the poor was also blamed.

Most of the editorials provided readers with a moral judgment about lessons learned from Egypt. Among the variables under moral judgment, “ripple effects” was prominent -- revolution in Egypt could spread to other nations. The contagious nature of Egyptians’ demand for political and economic reforms, triggered by the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia, led world editorial writers to caution against possible uprisings in other countries with autocrats, especially countries in the Middle East. Likewise, “corrupt governments ultimately fail and/or reform must start now” was also a moral lesson. Mubarak’s fall as Egypt’s last pharaoh served to remind the world that unresponsive governments that ignored the people’s desire for a better political and economic system will fail. His resignation also prompted the world editorials to moralize on the importance of swift democratic reform in Egypt to respond to the newly restive, newly empowered young generation that yearned not just for food but for basic human rights, respect and dignity. Moreover, the Egyptian uprising provided room for countries around the world to “reflect upon how their governments had responded to the uprising and what impact the uprising had on their countries.”

About two-thirds of the world editorials also dealt with treatment responsibility -- what can be done to solve the crisis in Egypt. They overwhelmingly recognized the importance of “starting the reform now” to establish a democratic political system that can represent the will of all Egyptians, and they also urged the new government or expressed confidence in the new government to assure a peaceful transition to democracy.

Differences Related to Political Freedom

The degree of political freedom, an extrinsic factor, did not affect how the editorials framed causal responsibility of the Egyptian uprising. All groups of extrinsic factor countries mentioned “political woes” as the dominant cause and “economic
woes” as the second cause. In assigning treatment responsibility, most editorials regarded immediate “political reforms” as the most important remedy for the future of Egypt. Even so, the percentage of this category among “not free” countries is much lower than “partly free” and “free” countries.

This factor, however, had an impact on how these editorials framed the moral judgments – lessons to be learned from the Egyptian revolution. Editorials from “not free” and “free” countries tend to warn against the “ripple effects” triggered by Egypt, while “partly free” countries stressed the lesson about “corrupt governments ultimately fail.” The reason for “free” countries, mostly represented by the West, to opt for “ripple effects” was probably because they had more of a global strategic view of the events that unfolded in Egypt, and this view led them to express conservative optimism about the prospect of democracy spreading in the Middle East. The “not free” countries, mostly represented by authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, felt the repercussions of Egyptian uprising closely enough to become introspective in their opinions. The “partly free” countries, having a limited level of freedom to criticize their governments, felt compelled to use this historical moment to warn their governments of the consequences of not heeding to people’s desire for more freedom.

**Differences Related to Religion**

Religion, another extrinsic factor, did not affect how the editorials framed the causal responsibility. They all attributed it first to “political woes” inherent with Mubarak’s dictatorship and second to “economic woes” experienced by the Egyptians under the corrupt Mubarak regime. These editorials also prescribed “swift move to reform or democracy” as the dominant treatment remedy for the future of Egypt.

The religion factor affected slightly how the editorials framed the moral judgments. For countries of “Buddhist and Hindu” and “Islamic” religions, the moral lessons were found in “watching out for ripple effects” and “corrupt governments ultimately failing.” While “Christian” and “Judaic” countries also emphasized “corrupt governments ultimately failing,” they put more
emphasis on “self-reflections” of those countries’ responses to the uprising or the uprising’s effect on those countries. The reason of this difference may be because the editorials from “Christian and Judaic” countries were largely represented by the United States and the Britain in the Western block, and their responses to the uprising were deemed influential in the Middle East.

**Differences Related to Geopolitical Regions**

Geopolitical regions, the third extrinsic factor, slightly affected how the editorials framed the causal responsibility. All regions, except the “Middle East and North Africa,” attributed “political woes inherent with dictatorship” as the dominant cause for the uprising and “economic woes” as the second cause. Editorials from the “Middle East and North Africa” had slightly more mentions of “economic woes” than “political woes.” This result may be explained by the fact that most countries in this region have authoritarian regimes that would want to divert the world’s attention from politics that directly challenged their legitimacy with economic problems. The same kind of mentality was reflected in the regions’ framing of the treatment responsibility. While all regions framed “swift moves to democratic reform” as the most important treatment remedy, the “Middle East and North Africa” lagged behind with their percentage.

The geopolitical regions variable also affected the editorials’ framing of moral judgments. Those from “Asia,” “Europe” and the “Middle East and North Africa” emphasized “watching out for ripple effects” as the dominant moral lesson while also recognizing the lesson of “corrupt governments ultimately fail.” For “Africa,” “corrupt governments ultimately fail” ranked first and “self-reflections of the uprising’s effects on the nation” ranked second. Many African nations have long been entangled in government corruption, so they used Egypt’s revolution to reflect upon their own struggles and warn against their ruling class about the consequences of not heeding people’s needs and aspirations. For the “Americas,” which was largely represented by editorials published in U.S. newspapers, “self-reflections on the country’s response to the uprising” was the most important
moral lesson to be learned. The influence of the United States in global politics was again demonstrated in these editorials’ framing of moral responsibility.

Conclusion

Overall, most world editorials framed the Egyptian uprising in this way: It was mainly caused by the political woes inherent with Mubarak’s dictatorship; it served as a moral lesson in that the uprising could trigger political, social or economic repercussion in other countries, especially countries with dictators; and Egypt’s future could be secured by the new government starting democratic reforms immediately.

The three extrinsic factors examined in this study affected in various degrees how the editorials framed the Egyptian uprising, especially in moral judgment — the lessons to be learned from the events in Egypt. The editorials from “partly free” countries deviated from those from “free” and “not free” countries by framing the moral lesson mainly as “corrupt governments ultimately fail.” The dominant moral lessons for editorials from “Buddhist and Hindu” countries and “Islamic” countries focused on “watching out for ripple effects” and “corrupt governments ultimately fail.” The lessons for “Christian and Judaic” countries were “corrupt governments ultimately fail” and “self-reflections.” Editorials from “Africa” and “Americas” deviated from the other geopolitical regions by stressing the importance of “corrupt governments ultimately fail” and “self-reflections on the country’s response to the uprising,” respectively.

This study captures world opinion during a key event in the Arab Spring — the successful revolution in Egypt — as expressed in English-language newspaper editorials. This study, however, is limited in several aspects. First, many countries are not represented in this study because they do not publish English newspapers or their English newspapers are not available in databases or available online. Second, while editorials in English newspapers in non-English-speaking countries can mirror elite opinions, they may not be a good representation of the overall public opinion. Third, the sample for the study is skewed toward English-speaking countries such as the United States,
Canada, Britain, Ireland and South Africa because of the availability of English newspapers in those countries. Future studies should look into Egypt’s continuing struggles to find its footing in the post-Mubarak years and world opinion during other important moments such as the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria to see if and how world opinion changes, especially when the events are not always as positive or bloodless. Studies of non-English papers, too, would give a fuller analysis of world opinion. From a methodological standpoint, combining framing analysis in political communication with factors influencing international news coverage has proved useful in answering not only what the world opinion was but also why it was that way.

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Book Review


Riveting, often horrific, photographs and brutally frank personal stories combine here to expose the hellishness of war as experienced by a remarkable corps of photojournalists working in Iraq. Readers will be struck by how dramatically the destructive reality of war presented in this book differs from the sanitized, virtually bloodless, version of the fighting -- no photographs of dead or wounded soldiers -- that they read in their news media. This difference is arguably the book’s central message. The photojournalists blame their editors back home for much of the censorship that prevented Americans from fully understanding the gruesome reality of the vicious fighting: “Yes, there is censorship within the military, but more disturbing than that is the censorship that comes from what is supposedly a free press.”

The book is organized around 39 in-depth interviews that author Michael Kamber conducted with his conflict photography peers representing the *New York Times, Agence France-Presse,* and other leading print news organizations. These previously unpublished images showcase the war as experienced by soldiers and civilians. Intentionally, none of the photographs show politicians or generals. More than 150 large, color photographs printed on high-quality paper vividly testify that talented photojournalists have “a lightning-fast and deeply sensitive ability to perceive the human predicament in a single moment and capture it forever.”

Warning: Readers may be emotionally jolted by some of the haunting photographs -- dozens of bodies lined up after being recovered from mass graves; the severed head of a female suicide bomber; the reflections of children in a puddle of blood; and
an Iraqi woman, whose leg was amputated after an American airstrike killed her unborn child and her sister.

With searing honesty, these photojournalists admit their fears, “We’re dead. We’re going to die.” They discuss how unbearable stresses sometimes escalated their drug and alcohol problems, and they recount how their marriages imploded and they lost touch with their children. These photojournalists explain why they were sometimes so overwhelmed by the human tragedy that their hands literally trembled when they tried to take photographs. Stunningly, one photojournalist reports how he instinctively picked up his camera and continued to snap pictures even after he stepped on a land mine that blew off his legs.

A number of the visual images taken by the seven female photojournalists powerfully present the devastating impact of war on women and children. Readers will inevitably wonder if male photojournalists could have, or would have, captured these moments. One female photographer featured Halla, an Iraqi woman, who turned to prostitution after her husband was shot and killed: “My life sucks, and I shouldn’t have to sleep with men to feed my children (ages two and four), so you can take pictures and show everyone exactly what is going on.” One photograph reveals Halla being gently kissed by her older son while the younger boy drinks milk from his bottle. Two others show Halla entertaining a customer.

Back in the United States, another female photojournalist captured what should have been a joyous wedding day. The beautiful bride wears a white gown and holds a bouquet of roses, but the reader’s eyes will inevitably focus on her Marine husband, whose face was horribly disfigured after he was the victim of a suicide bomb explosion. The husband and wife do not smile, do not touch, and do not look at each other. Shortly after their wedding, the couple divorced.

This is not a scholarly book. Kamber does not advance communication theory. He offers no hypotheses to be tested and presents no statistics, no index and no bibliography. In an age of too many superficial journalists senselessly chasing infotainment trivia, Kamber’s work does, however, remind professors and their students that many exceptionally devoted journalists still risk their lives to give the public the news a democracy requires.
Kamber masterfully integrates the photographs and written words, but presenting the interviews alphabetically as stand-alone pieces has its downside. Readers would benefit from more context, especially a section that organizes the revealing insights of the individual photographers into topical frameworks on such concerns as embedding and the changes in news coverage that occurred as the war progressed and financially imperiled print media could no longer sustain the costs. Nevertheless, this excellent, much-needed work can enrich a broad range of courses, especially visual communication and international communication.

With an eye to future war coverage, readers will want to ponder the final sentence of the thought-provoking foreword written by Dexter Filkins: “Photojournalism is today an embattled profession. When you read the testimonials here and peruse these stunning photographs, you may find yourself wondering whether the war in Iraq, for the men and women with cameras, was the last of its kind.”

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College of Charleston
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